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The Bases of Opposition to Affirmative Action: An Attitude Change Effort
Meisha-Ann Martin
ABSTRACT
The present study examined the effects of perceptions of fairness, prejudice and
collective self-interest on the affirmative action attitudes of 85 White undergraduate
students. Participants were classified as non-racists, modern racists or old-fashioned
racists based on their scores on the Implicit Association Test and Attitudes Toward
Blacks scale. In the first phase of the study, participants read affirmative action
information preceded by either high or low attention instructions. In the second phase,
fairness, status of position and race of the target of an affirmative action plan were
manipulated using vignettes. No significant differences were found in the first phase of
the study. In the second phase, it was found that when the plan was unfair and the target
Black, participants preferred plans for low status positions to plans for high status
positions. This finding was consistent with the idea that fairness, race and collective selfinterest are related to affirmative action attitudes. However, contrary to the initial
hypotheses, these effects did not interact with level of prejudice. Possible reasons for the
null results regarding prejudice were discussed.
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1
INTRODUCTION
The present study is concerned with the application of a theoretical model of
attitude change to affirmative action in order to evaluate the success of such efforts in the
changing of affirmative action attitudes. Variables such as perceptions of fairness, racial
prejudice and collective self-interest were examined in order to explore their effects on
the efficacy of the attitude change effort. To better understand what affirmative action is
and the significance of presenting accurate affirmative action information in the present
study, a brief history of affirmative action will now be presented.
Affirmative Action
In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11246 which stated that it was
illegal for federal employers, contractors and subcontractors with contracts of $10,000 or
more to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin. (Gender was
added in 1967 with Executive Order 11375). The order further required the
aforementioned employers to establish and maintain an affirmative action plan in every
facility employing 50 people or more. Affirmative action plans are defined as goals and
timetables for increasing the representation of women and minorities.
The agency that regulates affirmative action plans, the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP), requires federal employers to conduct utilization
analyses in order to check for the underutilization of women and minorities. These
analyses are conducted by determining the number of women and each minority group
employed based on job titles and comparing those percentages to their availability for
each job in the immediate area. Women and/or minorities are considered underutilized
when they are being employed at a rate lower than their availability.
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According to the OFCCP, the purpose of an affirmative action plan is to
counteract the underutilization of minorities and women. When women and minorities
are being underutilized, affirmative action plans are to be used to achieve utilization, not
to maintain it. Consistent with the definition of affirmative action plans as goals and
timetables, quotas are not be used to achieve utilization. Instead, employers are to use
“good faith efforts” to implement all aspects of an affirmative action plan. These may
include, for example, enhanced recruitment, selection and training efforts. Nongovernment organizations often voluntarily employ the above measures in order to
increase the representation of minorities in their workforce.
Arguably, affirmative action seems like a good idea. If minorities are found to be
under-represented in the workforce, affirmative action plans are used to correct this
imbalance. Still, affirmative action has been the subject of heated debate in the political
arena and has encountered much opposition. Why would affirmative action encounter
such widespread opposition? One proposed reason involves perceptions of the attributes
of affirmative action.
Perceptions of the Attributes of Affirmative Action
It is apparent that many fail to understand how affirmative action works. Bell,
Harrison and McLaughlin (2000) applied Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) conceptualization
of an attitude to affirmative action and, as part of this application, elicited tacit
affirmative action attributes from study participants in four studies. In accordance with
the approach suggested by Fishbein and Ajzen, participants were asked three questions:
(a) “In your own opinion, what are the advantages of affirmative action programs?”, (b)
“In your own opinion, what are the disadvantages of affirmative action programs?”, and
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(c) “What else comes to your mind when you think about affirmative action programs?”1.
Across the four studies, participants consistently reported that affirmative action plans
cause employers to hire less qualified (and reject qualified) employees, can produce
reverse discrimination against some people, frequently operate as quota systems and
create perceptions that minorities and women would not qualify equally on their own
merits. Interestingly, none of the participants mentioned recruitment and training efforts,
which, as noted above, can be part of an affirmative action plan.
Another study by Kravitz and Platina (1993) attempted to elicit affirmative action
beliefs using tactics a little different from the approach mentioned above. This time,
respondents were asked to evaluate the likelihood that various components would be true
of an affirmative action plan. In this study, participants rated the use of quotas as most
likely to be true of an affirmative action plan. However, contrary to the findings of Bell et
al., these participants thought it unlikely that affirmative action plans would involve
preferential treatment. Interestingly, participants also rated as unlikely actual components
of affirmative action such as the requirement that organizations with government
contracts or histories of discrimination develop an affirmative action plan, proportional
hiring based on the number of qualified applicants and the filing of reports to the
government of the distribution of employees.
The study by Kravitz and Platina also illustrates the relationship between
perceived attributes of an affirmative action plan and attitudes toward affirmative action.
Attitudes toward affirmative action varied as a function of expectations of the typical
1

Fishbein and Ajzen, originators of the theory of reasoned action, suggest that a person’s beliefs about an
attitude object can be elicited using a free-response format by asking for a list of characteristics, qualities
and attributes of the attitude object. The idea is that a person holds a large number of beliefs about an
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attributes of an affirmative action plan. Expectations that affirmative action involved
favoring minorities over a more qualified majority person and expectations of the use of
quotas in hiring (without regard to qualifications) were associated with negative attitudes
toward affirmative action. On the other hand, expectations that affirmative action
involved proportional hiring based on the number of qualified applicants were associated
with more positive affirmative action attitudes.
Perceptions of affirmative action attributes have also been found to vary as a
function of the race of the participant. In a study conducted by Kravitz and Klineberg
(2000), Whites, more so than Blacks and Hispanics, were inclined to believe that a
company with a typical affirmative action plan would hire more minorities and women
even if they were less qualified than candidates who are White males. White males were
also more likely to believe that affirmative action policies give unfair advantages to
minorities and women. Whites were less likely than the other ethnic groups (with the
exception of Hispanic immigrants) to perceive discrimination against Blacks and more
likely to perceive discrimination against Whites.
Another study by Bobo (1998) asked Whites, Blacks, Latinos and Asians their
level of agreement with the statement “Affirmative action for Blacks may force
employers to hire unqualified people”. Many Whites in the sample (47%) agreed with
this statement. Furthermore, Whites agreed with this statement significantly more than
did Blacks, Latinos or Asians.
The fact that perceptions of affirmative action attributes differ as a function of the
race of the respondent and attitudes toward affirmative action differ as a function of

attitude object, but only the most salient beliefs determine the person’s attitude. The above procedure is
designed to elicit these salient beliefs.
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perceptions of affirmative action attributes leads to the supposition that attitudes toward
affirmative action also differ as a function of race. This supposition has received
empirical support. Whites have consistently been found to be the strongest opponents of
affirmative action (Kravitz, 1995; Konrad & Linnehan, 1995; Kravitz & Platina, 1993).
In other studies, perceived affirmative action attributes were not specifically
assessed. Instead, attributes of affirmative action plans were presented. For example,
Summers (1995) presented participants with three descriptions (presented in random
order) detailing three different affirmative action methods – special training, differential
scoring and quotas. In such cases, affirmative action attitudes have still been found to
vary as a function of their attributes. The special training description informed
participants that some affirmative action plans included special training programs
available to members of a target group in order to improve their knowledge and skill
levels and make them more eligible for jobs. The differential scoring description
described setting different cutoff scores or otherwise adjusting scores on selection tests
for target group members. In the third description, quotas were explained. Participants
were least opposed to the special training affirmative action method and most opposed to
the differential scoring affirmative action method. Attitudes towards quotas were in
between attitudes toward special training and attitudes toward differential scoring. In
other words, participants preferred quotas to differential scoring and preferred special
training to quotas.
A comparable study by Doverspike and Arthur (1995) also found that attitudes
toward affirmative action differed as a function of how the plan was described.
Participants had more negative reactions to an affirmative action plan that involved the
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selection of a minority candidate with lower qualifications than the non-minority
candidate than they had to an affirmative action plan that involved choosing an equally
qualified minority candidate.
The above studies establish the relationship between attributes of affirmative
action plans (presented or perceived) and attitudes toward affirmative action. Attitudes
toward affirmative action change as a function of what the person believes to be the
attributes of the affirmative action plan. Some researchers have hypothesized that this
relationship is mediated by perceived fairness (Leck, Saunders & Charbonneau, 1996;
Summers 1995; Nacoste, 1990; Nacoste 1996).
Perceived Fairness
Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of a process while distributive
justice refers to the perceived fairness of an outcome (Greenberg, 1990). Procedural
justice seems to be more relevant to the issue of affirmative action for the following
reasons. First of all, violations of procedural justice are more important than violations of
distributive justice to perceptions of overall fairness (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992;
Greenberg, 1987). In other words, even if an outcome seems unfair, people often look at
the process that led to the outcome in order to evaluate overall fairness. Second of all,
according to Leventhal (1976), perceptions of procedural justice affect perceptions of
distributive justice. If a process is perceived to be procedurally unfair, then the fairness of
the outcome will be doubted. For the above reasons and also because affirmative action
itself is a process and not an outcome, the following evaluation of the perceived fairness
of affirmative action plans focus on procedural justice. Perceived fairness of the outcome
of affirmative action plans will not be directly considered.
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According to Nacoste’s (1990) procedural justice approach, the more weight taskrelevant criteria, such as job experience and professional degrees, are given in an
affirmative action plan, the greater the likelihood that the plan will be evaluated as fair
and the lower the likelihood that the plan will be opposed. Conversely, the more weight
group status, such as gender and race, is given in an affirmative action plan, the
probability that the plan will be evaluated as fair decreases and the probability that it will
be opposed increases. Therefore, reactions to affirmative action as well as evaluations of
fairness should change as a function of how the plan is framed. This supposition has
received empirical support.
Doverspike and Arthur (1995) found that an affirmative action plan was
considered fairer when it involved choosing between equally qualified candidates than
when it involved choosing a minority candidate with lower qualifications than a nonminority competitor. And, as stated before, participants are less likely to oppose the
former type of affirmative action plan than the latter.
More direct support of perceptions of fairness as a mediator comes from Kravitz
(1995), who found that when fairness ratings were entered first in a hierarchical
regression equation and type of affirmative action plan was entered second, type of
affirmative action plan failed to explain additional variance. A later study done by
Kravitz and Klineberg (2000) also found that Whites’ attitudes toward different
affirmative action plans varied as a function of beliefs that affirmative action gives unfair
advantages to women and minorities. Respondents’ reactions to two affirmative action
plans were sought. One affirmative action plan gave preference to a Black candidate over
a White candidate when both had the same qualifications and Blacks were
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underrepresented in the company. The other affirmative action plan entailed the hiring of
a less qualified Black candidate over a more qualified White candidate. Respondents who
did not believe affirmative action to be inherently unfair tended to have similarly neutral
attitudes toward both plans. However, respondents who did believe that affirmative
action was inherently unfair preferred the former plan to the latter even though they
opposed both. These findings suggest that the relationship between attitudes toward
affirmative action and type of affirmative action plan is largely mediated by the perceived
fairness of the affirmative action plan.
If perceived fairness of affirmative action and/or the attributes of affirmative
action completely explained attitudes toward affirmative action, then affirmative action
plans with attributes considered to violate the rules of procedural justice would always
and uniformly be opposed regardless of who the plan benefits (Rioux & Penner, 1999).
This, however, is not the case. Affirmative action plans benefiting Blacks typically
encounter more opposition than identical affirmative action plans benefiting other targets
(Dovidio, Gaertner, & Murrel, 1994; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner & Drout,
1994). Clayton and Tangri (1989) have also pointed out that violations of procedural
justice have not barred acceptance of other forms of preferential selection. Veterans
receive preference when they apply for certain civil service jobs and colleges and
universities give preferences in admissions to state residents and children of alumni and
professors. None of these preferential systems is perceived as unfair or immoral (Glasser,
1988). Several authors contend that prejudice toward the targets of affirmative action
may explain the greater opposition for affirmative action plans benefiting Blacks and is
yet another reason for opposition of affirmative action (Rioux & Penner, 1999; Dovidio,
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Mann & Gaertner, 1989, Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo & Kosterman, 1997, Bobo & Kluegel,
1993).
Modern Racism
Explicit negative attitudes toward Blacks can be classified as overt or oldfashioned racism. This type of racism involves the biologically based theory of African
racial inferiority, support for racial segregation and formal racial discrimination
(McConahay, 1986). The idea that Blacks are biologically inferior has generally lost
favor among most people and has been replaced by the non-racist ideology of
egalitarianism. As a result, even though negative racial attitudes and stereotypes persist,
they are now more are subtly expressed. In other words, explicit negative attitudes toward
Blacks have been largely replaced with more subtle or implicit negative attitudes. These
more subtle negative racial attitudes are called modern racism.
One form of modern racism is aversive racism. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986)
define aversive racism as “an attitudinal adaptation resulting from an assimilation of an
egalitarian value system with prejudice and racist beliefs”. Aversive racism represents a
subtle form of racism that is often unconscious and unintentional (Dovidio & Gaertner,
1999). Aversive racists, though they may consciously espouse values such as fairness,
justice and racial equality, unconsciously still harbor the negative racial beliefs and
feelings of a historically racist culture (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1989). Because aversive
racists consciously espouse egalitarian values, they will generally not discriminate
against Blacks in unambiguous situations where such behavior will be seen as prejudiced.
When the situation is ambiguous, however, and the norms for non-prejudiced behavior
are not clearly proscribed, then aversive racists will behave in ways that adversely impact
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Blacks while justifying their behavior in terms of non-race factors. In this way, aversive
racists discriminate against Blacks while protecting their self-image as a non-racist.
Symbolic racism is another form of modern racism. It is similar to aversive racism
but slightly different. Aversive racism focuses on subtle racism among liberals whereas
symbolic racism focuses on anti-Black socialization, conservatism and traditional
American values. As with aversive racism though, symbolic racists justify their racist
beliefs and behaviors using non-racist ideology and are also often unaware of their racist
feelings (McConahay, 1986). Under the aversive racism framework though, this
justification usually takes the form of egalitarian ideals; under the symbolic racism
framework, this justification usually takes the form of conservative political ideology.
According to the idea of symbolic racism, Whites are socialized to have negative
feelings toward Blacks (Dovidio, Mann & Gaertner, 1989). These feelings persist into
adulthood but are expressed indirectly and symbolically through, for instance, opposition
to social policies that benefit Blacks, rather than directly and overtly through, for
instance, support for segregation (McConahay & Hough, 1976). As a result, even though
many symbolic racists will no longer express anti-Black sentiments, presenting them with
racially targeted policies evokes anti-black responses (Sears et al., 1997). These
responses, though justified using non-racist ideology, operate to maintain the racial status
quo (McConahay & Hough, 1976). This type of racism also incorporates the belief that
racism is an idea of the past and that Blacks make excessive demands for special
treatment when they should be working harder to overcome their disadvantages (Sears,
1988). These ideas are embedded in strong American values such as work ethic,
discipline and respect for traditional authority (Kinder & Sears, 1981).
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Sears, Van Laar and Carrillo and Kosterman (1997) used archival data to illustrate
the link between symbolic racism and affirmative action. The study used four surveys
that incorporated measures of symbolic racism and affirmative action attitudes– the 1986
and 1992 National Election Studies, the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS) and the 1995
Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS). Correlational and regression analyses
indicated that symbolic racism was a consistent and powerful predictor of affirmative
action attitudes. For the four years of data administration, the correlations ranged from
.42 to .45.
Sears et al. provide compelling and empirically based arguments that symbolic
racism is at the core of White’s opposition to different policies that target Blacks. Factor
analyses of responses to different race-targeted policies suggest either a common factor
or several highly correlated factors. Sears et al. argue that race is the commonality among
all these different policies and symbolic racism is the uniform response. Sears et al. also
found that although, as stated before, anti-Black responses to social policy, under the
symbolic racism framework, are often expressed in terms of non-racist ideology, nonracial attitudes such as social welfare and traditional social values failed to predict
affirmative action attitudes as well as the measures of symbolic racism. In addition,
symbolic racism adds significant incremental variance to the prediction of affirmative
action attitudes over that of nonracial attitudes regardless of when it is added to the
regression equation. In studies that produced complementary results, Little, Murray and
Wimbush (1998) also found that symbolic racism significantly added to the prediction of
affirmative action attitudes over social desirability, race and gender and Jacobson (1985)
found that symbolic racism predicted negative affirmative action attitudes better than old-
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fashioned racism, stereotyping or self-interest. The link between affirmative action and
modern racism has been illustrated by at least one other researcher. Kravitz (1995) found
a significant inverse relationship between affirmative action attitudes and modern racism;
respondents who scored higher on an aversive racism scale tended to have less favorable
affirmative action attitudes.
Another theory of White’s resistance to affirmative action involves the idea of the
racial status quo. According to this reasoning, Whites’ oppose affirmative action because
it strives to change a racial status quo that is in their interest.
Collective Self-interest
According to Kinder and Sears (1981), White’s resistance to changes in the racial
status quo may not be racism; it could be a natural hostility that results from Whites’
perceptions that Blacks pose threats to their well being. This line of reasoning is derived
from realistic group conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). According to this
theory, Blacks and Whites are in competition for scarce resources. This perception of
threat by Whites creates hostility directed towards the source of the threat – Blacks.
Following this line of reasoning then, the driving force of this hostility is scarcity of
resources. When Whites and Blacks compete for scarce resources, the struggle for group
interests creates hostility.
If this theory holds, this would mean that Whites oppose affirmative action
because they perceive Blacks as competitive threats for valued social resources, status
and privileges currently held mostly by Whites (Bobo, 1998). Therefore, opposition to
affirmative action should vary as a function of the scarcity of the resources being sought.
In other words, Whites should oppose affirmative action plans for lower level positions
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less than they oppose affirmative action plans for higher level positions since higher level
positions represent scarcer resources than do lower level positions.
Studies that have examined opposition to affirmative action as a function of race
have produced results consistent with the collective self-interest hypothesis. As stated
before, Whites (especially White males), who have the least to gain from affirmative
action, tend to oppose affirmative action targeted toward Blacks more than other racial
groups do. In general, Blacks and women, who usually have the most to gain from
affirmative action, tend to have the least opposition to affirmative action (Kravitz, 2000;
Bobo, 1998; Kravitz & Platina, 1993). Further examination of affirmative action studies
show that when a group is the target of an affirmative action plan the group tends to be
the least opposed to the plan (Doverspike & Arthur, 1995; Summers, 1995, Konrad and
Linnehan, 1995). In addition, as pointed out by Bobo (1998), the fact that advocacy for
affirmative action has come principally from the traditional civil rights community is yet
another indicator that collective self-interest plays a role in affirmative action attitudes.
Still, few authors have undertaken the empirical investigation of collective selfinterest as a reason for opposition to affirmative action. Even less have addressed the idea
that attitudes toward affirmative action plan vary as a function of the position affirmative
action is applied to.
Investigations of self-interest as a contributor to affirmative action attitudes have
garnered equivocal results. Bobo (1998) used a large-scale telephone survey to
investigate the contributions of symbolic racism, political ideology and perceived threat
to self-interest to affirmative action attitudes. Bobo found that both symbolic racism and
perceived threat to self-interest were much more important than political ideology in
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predicting affirmative action attitudes. An earlier study by Kinder and Sears (1981)
attempted to predict preference for a Black or White mayoral candidate from symbolic
racism and perceived threats to self-interest. In this study, the results were slightly
different. First of all, the standardized regression coefficients obtained in this study for
self-interest items were much lower than those obtained in the Bobo study and often
failed to reach levels of statistical significance. Second of all, when Kinder and Sears
examined if perceived threats to self-interest added to the prediction of candidate
preference from symbolic racism they found that it did not. This is an examination Bobo
failed to conduct.
It is possible that results are equivocal because of the different ways self-interest
was operationalized. In the study conducted by Kinder and Sears (1981), self-interest
hypotheses were formed based on the idea of collective self-interest but self-interest was
operationalized in terms of threats to personal well being. In the Bobo (1998) study, the
measures of self-interest were more in line with the idea of protecting collective selfinterest. This may explain why Bobo (1998) obtained larger standardized regression
coefficients than did Kinder and Sears (1981).
Dovidio (2001) was one of the only authors to address the idea of reactions to
affirmative action changing as a function of the position affirmative action is applied to.
In his study, participants were asked to evaluate Black and White applicants with weak,
moderate and strong qualifications for a position. As expected, evaluations of Black
applicants increased as a function of their qualifications. More interesting though, is the
fact that the differences in evaluations given for Black and White applicants also changed
as a function of qualifications. As qualifications increased, so did the differences in
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evaluations. When qualifications were weak, evaluations for Black and White applicants
were approximately equal; when they were moderate, White applicants were evaluated
more favorably than Black applicants were; when they were strong, this difference
increased even more.
Although Dovidio’s study only investigated the effect of status of position on
affirmative action attitudes indirectly, his results may be explained by collective selfinterest. Presumably, the stronger the qualifications of the applicant, the greater the
perceived threat from that applicant. If this is indeed the case, these results should
generalize to affirmative action. Affirmative action applied to high status positions should
also produce more of a threat to collective self-interest than affirmative action applied to
low status positions. This increased threat to collective self-interest should create greater
discrimination against Black applicants as evidenced in Dovidio’s study. However, in the
context of the present study, this discrimination should be manifested as greater
opposition to the affirmative action plan.
In the present study, self-interest will be considered generally, as collective selfinterest as opposed to personal self-interest, in support of the idea that opposition to
affirmative action stems from the fear of Whites that the racial status quo will change in a
way that is less to their favor. In addition, status of applicant will be manipulated in an
attempt to generalize Dovidio’s (2001) results to affirmative action.
Present study
Three reasons for White opposition to affirmative action have been examined –
perceived unfairness, racism and threat to collective self-interest. These three factors are
not mutually exclusive and all play in role in the formation of affirmative action attitudes.
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How then, given all these factors, can affirmative action attitudes be changed? Which
factors aid in the attitude change effort?
According to Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action, a person’s
attitude toward an attitude object is determined by that person’s beliefs about the attitude
object. Therefore, any attitude change effort must always be directed at an individual’s
beliefs. According to this theory, attitudes toward an attitude object are the direct result of
the perceived attributes of the object – perceived attributes being the multiplicative
product of beliefs about the object and evaluations of those beliefs. Therefore, an attitude
change effort can either focus on changing beliefs about the object or on changing
evaluations of those beliefs. And, since perceived attributes are influenced by information
about the attitude object, information given about the attitude object can serve as the
vehicle to change beliefs or evaluations of beliefs.
Following these ideas, Bell et al. (2000) undertook one particularly ambitious
effort to change attitudes towards affirmative action using Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975)
conceptualization of attitudes. Bell et al. (2000) found partial support for the theory of
reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) as applied to affirmative action. Firstly,
attitudes towards affirmative action were found to vary as a function of perceived
attributes - the multiplicative product of beliefs about affirmative action and evaluations
of those beliefs, i.e. feelings about the believed attributes. Secondly, since perceived
attributes, according to the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), are
influenced by information about the attitude object, affirmative action information was
manipulated in an attempt to change affirmative action attitudes. Providing negative
information about affirmative action resulted in less favorable attitudes than did
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providing positive or neutral information. Further inspection of the data showed that the
attitudes of White participants could be made more negative but not more positive. The
authors suggest that future studies could attempt to present favorable information about
affirmative action persuasively in an attempt to change affirmative action attitudes. This
suggestion is consistent with Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) observation that persuasive
communication corresponds with attitude change efforts that attempt to change beliefs by
presenting information from outside sources.
The present study attempts to extend the work of Bell et al. (2000) by following
the suggestion to present affirmative action information persuasively as part of the effort
to change affirmative action attitudes. To this end, the Elaboration Likelihood Model of
persuasion will be used (Petty & Cacciopo, 1981). According to this model of persuasion,
there are two routes to attitude change – the central route and the peripheral route. When
the central route is taken, attention is paid to the content of the message as opposed to
superficial cues and any resulting attitude change is more likely to be permanent. When
the peripheral route is taken, attention is paid to superficial cues such as length of the
message and expertise of the source of the message and not to the actual content of the
message. In addition, any resulting attitude change is less likely to be permanent.
Choice of persuasive route is dependent on motivation and ability. In order to take
the central route of processing to attitude change, one must have the motivation and
ability to do so. Motivation refers to anything that prompts the receiver of the information
to pay attention to the message. Ability, on the other hand, refers to the presence of
cognitive resources that allow for attention to the message. For the present study, it was
assumed that all participants had the ability to pay attention to the content of the
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persuasive message. Motivation was provided using instructions. These instructions
asked the participants to pay careful attention to the message and informed participants
that they would be asked questions about the information presented.
Paying attention to the content of the message is especially important in the
present study because beliefs are being targeted. The objective is to have participants
change their beliefs and replace them with the information presented. For this to occur,
the information must first be attended to.
A successful persuasive presentation of accurate affirmative action information
would address misperceptions of affirmative action. It would not, however, address
prejudice. Therefore, it was expected that when accurate affirmative action information is
presented persuasively and reactions to a specific plan are sought, old-fashioned racists
would have more negative reactions to affirmative action than would modern racists since
old-fashioned racists oppose affirmative action primarily because of undisguised racism.
Modern racists, on the other hand, oppose affirmative action for a number of reasons.
They oppose affirmative action because of subtle racism, because they perceive
affirmative action to be unfair due to their misconceptions of its reality and probably
because affirmative action is against their self-interests. According to Rioux and Penner
(1999), for modern racists, claims of unfairness are used to camouflage racism, which is
the real reason for opposition to affirmative action. Therefore, when the situation is
unambiguous and unfairness can no longer be used as an excuse for opposition, modern
racists will not oppose affirmative action. Nevertheless, the underlying racism that caused
them to oppose affirmative action in the first place will still be present. As a result, when
the situation becomes more ambiguous, attitudes driven by racism will again appear. On
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the other hand, if participants who are neither old-fashioned nor modern racists oppose
affirmative action, they tend to do so because their misconceptions of its reality really
cause them to believe it is unfair.
In the present study, two scales were administered to participants to determine
their level of prejudice – an old-fashioned racism scale designed to measure explicit
racial attitudes and a scale designed to measure subtle and implicit negative racial
attitudes. Participants who scored above the median on the subtle racism scale and had a
mean score that was above the neutral point on the old-fashioned racism scale were
classified as old-fashioned racists. Participants who scored above the median on the
subtle racism scale and had a mean score that was below the neutral point on the oldfashioned racism scale were classified as modern racists. Participants who scored below
the median on the subtle racism scale and had a mean score that was below the neutral
point on the old-fashioned racism scale were classified non-racists. This is similar to the
classification scheme employed by Dovidio (2001). Old-fashioned racists explicitly
indicate that they are racist and, according to the implicit measure, they are; subtle racists
claim explicitly not to be racist but according to the implicit measure they are; non-racists
claim explicitly not to be racists and according to the implicit measure they are not.
Because these measures will be administered last to prevent priming participants with
race, these classifications will only be made prior to data analysis.
The study was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, accurate affirmative
action information was presented to all participants. In addition, half of the participants
received instructions asking them pay careful attention to the message and informing
them that questions would be asked later about the content of the message (high attention
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condition). Half of the participants received instructions asking them to read the
information very quickly as they only had a few minutes (low attention condition).
Attitudes toward affirmative action were then measured. It was expected that affirmative
action attitudes would differ as a function of prejudice level, supporting the idea that
racism is a determinant of affirmative action attitudes.
Hypothesis 1a: Old-fashioned racists and modern racists will have less positive
attitudes toward affirmative action than will non-racists.
It was also expected that the attention manipulation would affect participants differently
as a function of their level of prejudice. For old-fashioned racists, paying attention to the
content of the message should evoke more negative cognitions directed toward Blacks.
For modern racists, paying attention to the message should highlight the fairness of the
message since the message will depict accurate affirmative action information found to
be fair by participants of previous studies. Therefore, a two-way interaction between
prejudice level and attention was predicted; the effects of attention were expected to vary
as a function of prejudice level.
Hypothesis 1b: Old-fashioned racists in the high attention condition will have
less positive affirmative action attitudes than old-fashioned racists in the low
attention condition. Modern racists and non-racists in the high attention
condition will have more favorable affirmative action attitudes than modern
racists and non-racists in the low attention condition. (See Figure 1.)
The second phase of the study focused more on the relationship between subtle
racism and reactions to affirmative action. In this phase, each participant was presented
with two vignettes. Fairness of plan, race and status of the target person were
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manipulated. Each variable had two levels. The plan was either be fair or unfair, the
target (always a female to ensure applicability for affirmative action) was either Black or
White and she was seeking either a high or low status position. A two-way interaction
between fairness and prejudice level was expected; the effects of fairness on affirmative
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action attitudes would vary as a function of prejudice levels.

High Attention

Low Attention
Non-racists
Modern
racists
Old-fashioned racists

Figure 1. Hypothesized interaction between attention and prejudice level

Hypothesis 2a: The fairness manipulation will produce no effects for oldfashioned racists; they will equally oppose fair and unfair affirmative action
plans. Modern racists and non-racists in the fair condition will have more
positive attitudes toward the affirmative action plan than modern racists and
non-racists in the unfair condition. (See Figure 2.)
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This two-way interaction would be qualified by race of target. It was expected that the
effects of fairness and race of target on affirmative action attitudes would vary as a
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function of prejudice level.

Fair

Unfair
Non-racists
Modern racists
Old-fashioned
racists

Figure 2. Hypothesized interaction between fairness and prejudice level

Hypothesis 2b: Old-fashioned racists in the Black target condition will have
more negative attitudes toward the affirmative action plan than old-fashioned
racists in the White target condition. Fairness of plan will produce no effects
when the target is Black, but when the target is White, a fair plan will be
preferred to an unfair one. The race manipulation will not produce any effects
for modern racists in the fair condition. Modern racists in the unfair condition
will have more negative attitudes toward the affirmative action plan when the
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target is a Black female than when the target is a White female. Non-racists will
not be affected by the race of the target but will prefer a fair plan to an unfair
one. (See Figure 3.).
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Fairness of plan
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Fairness of plan

Unfair

Fair
Fairness of plan

Black target

Black target

Black target

White
Target

White
Target

White
Target

Figure 3. Hypothesized interaction between race, fairness and prejudice level

According to Dovidio (2001), aversive racists have more negative attitudes
toward affirmative action and other social policies when they are directed toward high
status Blacks. This may be related to self-interest. High status Blacks are competing for
scarce positions and support for a policy that aids in obtaining such a position would
clearly violate the self-interest of Whites. Consistent with the realistic group conflict
theory, this competition for scarce resources will produce more hostility than if a low
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status Black is competing for a position that is not as scarce. Therefore, it was expected
that the three-way interaction hypothesized would be exacerbated by status of target.
Hypothesis 2c: The status manipulation will have no effects on old-fashioned
racists and non-racists. Modern racists will have less positive attitudes toward
the affirmative action plan when the plan is unfair, the woman is Black and she
has a high status than when the plan is unfair, the woman is Black and she has
a low status. (See Figure 4.)
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Figure 4. Hypothesized interaction between race, fairness, status and prejudice level
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METHOD
Participants
Eighty-five White undergraduate Psychology students (71 females and 14 males)
from a large southeastern university participated in exchange for extra class credit.
Materials
A paper and pencil version of the implicit association test (IAT) was used to
measure implicit negative racial attitudes. The IAT assesses the association between race
and positive or negative attributes by measuring latency of response. The idea is that
one’s implicit racial attitudes are salient and dominant. Therefore, someone with negative
attitudes toward Blacks should have more difficulty associating Blacks with positive
attributes than they have associating Blacks with negative attributes since the
Black/negative association is more salient and dominant than the Black/positive
association. Using this rationale, the paper-based verbal stimuli version of the IAT
compares participants’ speed at categorizing words as either Black/pleasant or
White/unpleasant with their speed at categorizing words as either Black/unpleasant or
White/pleasant to see which set of associations is more dominant.
The paper-based verbal stimuli IAT is divided into two halves, one for the
White/Unpleasant association and one for the White/Pleasant association (see Appendix
1). Each half is comprised of two columns. The column headings are dependent on which
half of the IAT is being administered. The left heading is either White/Pleasant or
White/Unpleasant. The right heading is either Black/Pleasant or Black/Unpleasant. In the
middle of each column there is a list of words and names, each flanked on the left and
right by a circle. The circle on the left corresponds to the left column heading and the
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circle on the right corresponds to the right column heading. The participant is instructed
to look at the word or name, make a classification and mark the circle corresponding to
the appropriate column heading. Participants are to classify names as either Black or
White and words as either pleasant or unpleasant.
The IAT is scored by comparing the number of correct responses completed in 20
seconds for each set of pairings. Again, the assumption is that if one holds negative
implicit attitudes toward Blacks, then categorizing words as Black/pleasant or
White/unpleasant would be more difficult and thus take longer than categorizing words as
Black/unpleasant or White/pleasant because the former is a more unfamiliar pairing than
the latter. Therefore, in the 40 seconds allotted (20 seconds for each pairing), someone
with negative implicit attitudes toward Blacks would complete more Black/unpleasant
and White/pleasant categorizations than Black/pleasant and White/unpleasant
categorizations.
In an investigation of reliability and utility conducted by Lemm, Sattler, Khan,
Mitchell and Dahl (2002), the paper-based verbal stimuli IAT was found to have
acceptable test-retest reliability (mean r = .57) and acceptable correlations with the
conceptually similar computer-based IAT (mean r = .33). For this reason, and the fact
that the paper-based verbal stimuli IAT was more convenient to administer than the
computer-based IAT (especially when running participants in groups), the paper-based
verbal stimuli IAT was used for the present study.
The Attitudes toward Blacks (ATB) scale created by Brigham (1993) was used to
measure explicit racism. The ATB (see Appendix 2) is comprised of 25 questions
including 5 questions from the Modern Racism Scale. The response format for all
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questions is a five point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly
Agree (5)”. A larger total score indicates more negative racial attitudes. This scale
correlates substantially with the Multifactor Racial Attitudes Inventory – Short Scale (r =
.86) and Kinder and Sears’(1981) index of expressive racism (r = .45), demonstrating
some convergent validity. This scale also has excellent internal reliability (α=.88).
Following an approach used by Summers (1995), attitudes toward affirmative
action in general and specific affirmative action scenarios were assessed using a 9-point
semantic differential scale with seven bipolar verbal descriptors. The verbal descriptors
were: Right-Wrong, Correct-Incorrect, Unjust-Just, Positive-Negative, Unfair-Fair,
Objective-Biased. Some items were reverse coded so that higher total scores reflected
more positive attitudes.
Experimental Design
As mentioned before, the experiment was conducted in two phases. The
independent variables in the first phase were prejudice and attention to the persuasive
message. There were three levels of prejudice (modern, old-fashioned and nonprejudiced) and two levels of attention (high attention and low attention), making the first
phase of the study a 2x3 between-subjects factorial design.
In the second phase of the study, three variables were manipulated using a
factorial survey design. This design combines elements of a traditional factorial design
with the methodology of survey sampling. The researcher first creates a “factorial object
universe” by combining all possible levels of the variables under study. This creates a
number of vignettes. For example, if three variables are being investigated and each
variable has two levels then eight vignettes would be created. These vignettes would
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represent all possible combinations of the levels of variables. Each participant then
receives and responds to a random sample of vignettes from the factorial object universe.
In the factorial survey design, the item becomes the level of analysis. Individual
judgements of items (levels of variables) are pooled to provide a sample of judgements.
These samples of responses are then used to assess main effects and interactions.
The factorial survey design is very useful for the empirical investigation of
socially sensitive issues (Rossi & Anderson, 1982). In the traditional within-subjects
factorial design, each participant receives all levels of all variables. In this case, the
purpose of the study might become obvious to the participants and they may be inclined
to provide only socially acceptable answers. In the factorial survey design approach, it is
much harder for the participant to guess the purpose of the study and change answers
accordingly because he/she is only presented with a random sample of conditions. For
this reason, this design has been used in the past by researchers investigating socially
sensitive issues (Murrell et al., 1994; Rioux & Penner, 1999). The factorial survey design
was used for the present study because it improved on the between-subject factorial
design. This design makes it harder for participants to guess the purpose of the study and
it also allows for a more efficient use of participants because one participant receives
more than one vignette and so responds to more levels of each variable.
A “factorial object universe” was created using three variables: fairness of
scenario, race of the target of the affirmative action plan and status of the position that the
affirmative action plan was applied to. Therefore, the vignettes were varied based on
these three variables.
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Each vignette had a basic scenario. A fictitious company (XYZ) discovered that it
was hiring minorities at a rate disproportionate to the numbers of minorities available in
the workforce. To correct this discrepancy, the company decided to implement an
affirmative action plan. The vignette was presented as an example of this affirmative
action plan.
In each vignette, a White male and a female are competing for a position and,
because of the affirmative action plan, the female is awarded the position. The female
was always the target of the affirmative action plan to ensure that even when race varied,
the target was still eligible for affirmative action. The White male was always her
competitor because White males are not eligible for affirmative action. The female target
was either White or Black, seeking a high status position (Vice President of Marketing)
or a low status position (data entry clerk) and the scenario presented in the vignette was
either fair or unfair. An unfair scenario was operationalized as one in which the female
target received the position even though she was less qualified than the White male. A
fair scenario was operationalized as one in which the female was equally qualified for the
position. These operationalizations were based on previous research findings of which
facets of affirmative action are considered fair and unfair (Doverspike & Arthur, 1995).
Participants were classified on prejudice level using the prejudice measures (IAT
and ATB) after the data was collected.
Procedure
Participants were run in groups of three or less. Each participant completed the
study materials in a secluded room.
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In the first phase of the study, each participant was first given a short passage
about affirmative action to read (see Appendix 3). This passage included statistical
information to show the comparative lack of opportunities for minorities and women in
the workplace and an explanation of the mechanics of affirmative action. This
information was used to make an argument for the necessity of affirmative action plans in
the workplace.
The instructions preceding the passage varied depending on which attention
condition the participant was in. Participants in the high attention condition were
instructed to read the material very carefully, because they would be asked content-based
questions at the end of the experimental session. These participants were left alone to
read it and signaled the experimenter when they were through.
Participants in the low attention condition were instructed to read the material
very quickly, as they only had a few minutes. Participants in this condition were given
two and a half minutes.
When the participants signaled the experimenter (high attention condition) or
when the participant’s two and a half minutes were up (low attention condition), the
experimenter collected the affirmative action passage and gave the participant a 9-point
semantic differential scale entitled “Affirmative Action” to complete. At the signal from
the participant, the experimenter collected the completed semantic differentials.
In the second phase of the study, each participant was presented with two
randomly chosen affirmative action vignettes. After each vignette, participants
responded to the same semantic differential scale used in the first phase of the study.
The subject of these semantic differential scales, however, was “XYZ’s Affirmative
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Action Plan”. The experimenter collected the first vignette and the completed semantic
differential before the second vignette and semantic differential were given to the
participants.
After the second vignette and semantic differential were collected, each
participant completed the paper and pencil verbal stimuli Implicit Association Test (IAT)
scale. The paper and pencil IAT was preceded by a practice task in which participants
were asked to categorize words as insect/good or flower/bad as well as the reverse,
insect/bad and flower/good. For the practice task, each participant received the
insect/good and flower/bad association first, followed by the insect/bad and flower/good
association. However, for the critical tasks, order was counterbalanced so that
approximately half the participants attempted the White/pleasant and Black/unpleasant
associations first and the other half attempted the White/unpleasant and Black/pleasant
association first. In both the practice task and the critical task, participants were given 20
seconds per set of association (e.g. White/pleasant and Black/unpleasant) to categorize as
many words as they could.
Finally, after the IAT was completed and collected, participants completed the
Attitudes Toward Blacks scale.
Analyses
Data from the first phase of the study was analyzed using a between subjects 2X3
ANOVA. Data from the second phase of the study was examined for main effects and
two and three way interactions by conducting a mixed model 3x2x2x2 ANOVA on the
factorial survey design. Since the vignette was the unit of analysis and prejudice levels
differ as a function of vignettes, prejudice level were considered as a within-subjects
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variable. The hypothesis involving the four-way interaction (Hypothesis 2c) was tested
using a planned comparison. Therefore, the ANOVA was not fully crossed. It was only
used to examine the main effects, two-way and three-way interactions.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
A pilot study was conducted before the actual study in order to carry out a
manipulation check on the attention instructions to be used in the first phase of the
experiment. Sixty-four participants were randomly assigned to either the high attention
instructions or the low attention instructions, received the affirmative action message, and
then were asked a series of multiple-choice questions (see Appendix 4).
The first question asked the participants to choose the statement that best
described how carefully they read the affirmative action information. The answers ranged
from “I read the information more carefully than I usually read other material” to “I read
the information a lot less carefully than I usually read other information. The second
question tested participants’ memory of the instructions they received by asking them to
pick the statement that was included with their affirmative action information. The
statements were: a) Please circle all positive statements about affirmative action; b)
Please circle all negative information about affirmative action; c) Please read the
following information carefully, as you will be asked questions about the content at the
end of the session; and d) Please read the following information as quickly as possible as
you only have a few minutes. The correct answer was always either c or d. because
statements a and b were never included in the instructions. The final seven questions
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asked about the affirmative action information presented. In all the analyses that follow
the alpha level was set at .05
Participants in the high attention condition reported significantly paying more
attention to the affirmative action information, t(66) = 5.413, p < .0001, (Ms = 3.44 vs.
2.65) and answered marginally more of the content based questions correctly t(66) =
1.857, p = .068, (Ms = 4.59 vs. 3.91). All participants correctly identified the instructions
they received.
A second set of preliminary analyses was done for the semantic differential
conducted to assess feelings about affirmative action and the semantic differential
entitled “XYZ’s affirmative action plan ”. These analyses were conducted after the final
study was completed in order to determine if, for subsequent analyses, individual items
could be combined into a total score.
Item analyses indicated that both scales demonstrated excellent internal
reliability; α = .93 for the general affirmative action semantic differential and α = .97 for
the affirmative action plan semantic differential. All item-to-total correlations were
greater than .7. Based on these results, for both semantic differentials, individual
semantic differential items were combined into a total score.
Prejudice Level Classifications
The IAT was scored by calculating the difference in the number of items
completed for the White/Pleasant and Black/Unpleasant associations vs. the
White/Unpleasant and Black/Pleasant associations. The median difference score for the
IAT was 2, with a range from –7 to 18. The mean of difference scores was 2.94, and the
standard deviation 4.17. The median was used instead of the mean because medians are
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less affected by the extreme scores. Unlike the approach taken with the IAT, the neutral
point of the ATB scale (3) was used for the prejudice classification. The ATB was treated
differently because it was expected that since the ATB is an explicit measure of racism
and racism is not socially acceptable, quite a few responses would be socially acceptable
but not necessarily truthful. Therefore, it would be more meaningful to compare the
responses of individual participants to the neutral point of the scale than to compare the
scores to an average of the group, which would be biased in the direction of positive
attitudes.
Since higher scores on the ATB indicate more negative racial attitudes,
participants who had a mean score that was below 3 were considered to have positive
attitudes toward Blacks and participants who had a mean score that was above 3 were
considered to have negative racial attitudes toward Blacks. Almost all of the participants
had a mean score that was below 3, supporting the above expectation that an average of
the group would be biased in the direction of more positive racial attitudes.
Participants who scored above the median on the IAT and above the neutral point
of the ATB were considered old-fashioned racists because the participant admitted to
negative racial attitudes (ATB) and easier associated White with pleasant and Black with
unpleasant (IAT) than White with unpleasant and Black with pleasant. However, since
almost all participants scored below the neutral point of the ATB, only one participant
was classified as an old-fashioned racist. Since this was not enough to conduct
comparative analyses, this classification was not considered in the subsequent analyses.
Participants who scored above the median on the IAT and below the neutral point on the
ATB were considered aversive racists. These participants reported positive racial
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attitudes on the ATB but also found it easier to associate White with pleasant and Black
with Unpleasant than White with unpleasant and Black with pleasant. Participants who
scored below the median on the IAT and below the neutral point on the ATB were
considered non-racists. These participants reported positive racial attitudes on the ATB
and they did not have an easier time with the White/Pleasant and Black/Unpleasant
associations than with the White/Unpleasant and Black/Pleasant associations.
Prejudice level classifications were done conservatively. Participants on the
median of the IAT were considered below the median. In one case, a participant scored
below the mean on the IAT and above the neutral point on the ATB. The IAT was given
more weight in this case since it is harder to disguise one’s true racial attitudes on the
IAT than on the ATB; the participant was classified as a non-racist.
Main Analyses
General Affirmative Action Attitudes
In this phase of the study, it was expected that participants’ general affirmative
action attitudes would vary as a function of prejudice so that modern racists would have
less positive affirmative action attitudes than non-racists. This was not the case. Attitudes
toward affirmative action did not differ as a function of prejudice level, F (1,79) = .140, p
> .05. Modern racists did not have less positive affirmative action attitudes than nonracists (Ms = 43.93 vs. 43.05). Therefore, Hypothesis 1a was not supported.
An interaction between prejudice level and attention was also hypothesized. It
was expected that the effect of attention on modern and non-racists would be different
from the effect of attention on old-fashioned racists. Since there were insufficient oldfashioned racists for this analysis, only the data for modern and non-racists were used.
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Without the old-fashioned racists in the analysis, the pattern of results expected no longer
forms an interaction since modern and non-racists were expected to behave in the same
fashion. Therefore, the data were only examined for a main effect of attention. It was
expected that participants who received the high attention instructions would have more
positive affirmative action attitudes than participants who received the low attention
instructions. Contrary to expectations, there was no main effect of attention, F (1, 79) =
.714, p > .05. Participants in the high attention condition did not have more positive
affirmative action attitudes than participants in the low attention condition (Ms = 42.27
vs. 44.47). Therefore, the amended hypothesis 1b was not supported.
Since old-fashioned racists were dropped from the analyses, it was necessary to
change some of the remaining hypotheses. In instances where the modern and non-racists
were expected to act alike but different from the old-fashioned racists the hypotheses
concerned changed from being about interactions to being about main effects. However,
when the modern and non-racists were expected to behave differently, the hypotheses
remained about interactions.
Affirmative Action Plan Attitudes
It was expected that old-fashioned racists would not be affected by the fairness of
the affirmative action plan but modern and non-racists would prefer a fair affirmative
action plan to an unfair affirmative action plan. As explained above, since modern and
non-racists were expected to behave the same, the data were examined for a main effect
of fairness. A main effect of fairness was found, F (1,1) = 15820.755, p < .01.
Participants preferred a fair affirmative action plan (M = 42.15, SD = .282) to an unfair
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affirmative action plan (M = 17.05, SD = .282). Therefore, the amended Hypothesis 2a
was supported.
Although no other main effects were expected, there were two other main effects
that were marginally significant. Non-racists were somewhat more supportive of the
affirmative action plans (M = 31.59, SD = 8.08) than were aversive racists (M = 27.60,
SD =0.243), F (1,1) = 115.01, p = .059.
Race of target was also marginally significant, F (1,1) = 123.49, p = .057.
Participants preferred affirmative action plans for White targets (M = 30.71, SD = .282)
over affirmative action plans for Black targets (M = 28.49, SD = .282).
Status of position was not significant, F (1,1) = 4.12, p < .05. In other words,
participants’ reacted to affirmative action plans for the high status position (Vice
President of Marketing) the same way they reacted to affirmative action plans for the low
status position (data entry clerk), (Ms = 29.40 vs. 29.80).
Although not hypothesized, there was a significant two-way interaction between
fairness and status F (1,1) = 46.325, p <.05 (see Figure 5). When the plan was fair,
participants preferred plans applied to high status positions to plans applied to low status
positions. However, when the plan was unfair, participants preferred plans applied to low
status positions than they did to plans applied to high status positions. These differences
were not large enough to produce significant LSD’s.
It was hypothesized that the race of target and the prejudice level of the
participant would qualify the main effect found for fairness. Non-racists would not be
affected by the race of the target but modern racists would oppose an unfair affirmative
action plan more when the target was Black than when the target was White. This three-
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way interaction between target race, fairness of plan and prejudice level did approach
significance F (1,1) = 59.49, p = .082 (see Figure 6). Planned comparisons were
subsequently used to examine the differences between cell means.
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Figure 5. Interaction between fairness of plan and status of position.
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The pattern of results did not conform to expectations. The differences in means
for non-racists when the target was Black vs. White in the fair condition approached
significance, t (8) = -1.87, p = .099, with plans targeted toward Whites being more
popular than plans targeted toward Blacks (Ms = 46.89 vs. 41.14). In addition, contrary to
expectations, the small difference in affirmative action attitudes observed for modern
racists when the target was Black (M = 12.71) vs. when the target was White (M = 17.14)
was not significant, t (8) = -1.44, p > .05.
According to the last hypothesis, hypothesis 2c, modern racists were expected to
have less positive attitudes toward an affirmative action plan when the plan was unfair,
the target Black and the position high status than when the plan was unfair, the target
Black and the position low status. Since these were the only cells of interest in the fourway interaction, a t-test was used to examine the difference between these means.
This hypothesis was not supported. There was no difference in affirmative action
attitudes for modern racists when the plan was unfair, the target Black and high status
(M = 13.3) and when the plan was unfair, the target Black and the plan low status (M =
12.13), t (16) = .425, p < .05.
DISCUSSION
General Affirmative Action Attitudes
In the first phase of the study, where general affirmative action information was
presented, a main effect of prejudice and an interaction between the manipulation of
attention to the message and participant prejudice level were expected. With regard to the
former, it was expected that old-fashioned racists and modern racists would have less
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positive affirmative action attitudes than non- racists. With regard to the latter, it was
expected that modern and non-racists would have more positive affirmative action
attitudes when they were in the high attention condition than when they were in the low
attention condition because, for these groups, paying attention to the message should
highlight the inherent fairness of affirmative action. However, for old-fashioned racists, it
was expected that they would have more positive affirmative action attitudes when they
were in the low attention condition because the high attention condition should make race
more salient and thus elicit prejudice. It was not possible to test the main effect or
interaction with a group of old-fashioned racists because not enough of them were
identified for the comparisons. The differential effects of the attention manipulation on
old-fashioned racists were the basis of the original hypothesized interaction. Since both
modern and non-racists were expected to be have more positive affirmative action
attitudes in the high attention condition than in the low attention condition, the data were
analyzed just for a main effect of attention instead of for an interaction between attention
and prejudice level.
Based on previous research (Kravitz, 1995; Jacobson, 1985; Little et al., 1998 &
Sears et al., 1997), it was expected that non-racists would have more favorable attitudes
toward affirmative action than would modern racists. This was not the case. Both groups
reported relatively positive affirmative action attitudes (the mean response was 6.21 on a
9-point semantic differential scale where higher scores indicated more positive attitudes).
Since affirmative action is generally not received well by Whites (Kravitz &
Platina, 1993; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000), the positive affirmative action attitudes shown
by both groups may seem surprising. It is conceivable that these positive attitudes were
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the result of demand characteristics. This is possible, but there were several factors that
would argue against this explanation. The experimenters were White (which should have
reduced the discomfort of showing negative affirmative action attitudes in the presence of
a Black person). Furthermore, each participant completed the semantic differential
attitude measure without the experimenter present, which should have reduced the
possibility of participants changing responses that were not socially acceptable because
of the presence of the experimenter. It is also conceivable that exposure to the persuasive
affirmative action information increased support of affirmative action. It is impossible to
tell if this was the case because participants’ affirmative action attitudes were not
measured before the affirmative action information was read. Future studies are needed to
examine attitude change as a result of exposure to accurate and persuasive affirmative
action information.
In retrospect, these findings might have been expected. According to previous
research, attitudes toward affirmative action are based on the perceived fairness of
affirmative action in general (Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000). Also, modern racists tend to
explain their opposition to affirmative action using non-racist justifications (McConahay,
1986; Sears et al., 1997). The argument that affirmative action is unfair is one such
justification. Therefore, since the affirmative action information was worded to dispel
any notions of unfairness, it is understandable that, without that justification, modern
racists had attitudes similar to those of non-racists.
The attention manipulation was unsuccessful in creating differences in affirmative
action attitudes. This was surprising because the attention manipulations were the basis of
a persuasive attempt based on the well-established Elaboration Likelihood Model of
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persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). The high attention condition was designed to elicit
the central route of processing and the low attention condition was designed to elicit the
peripheral route of processing. Accordingly, if attention did vary as intended, participants
who received high attention instructions should have recalled more of the affirmative
action information and reported paying more attention to that information than did
participants who received the low attention instructions. The instructions were pilot tested
to ensure that this was, in fact, the case. The pilot study supported this hypothesis, so it is
unlikely that the failure to find a main effect of attention was due to failure to
successfully manipulate attention.
The general idea was to create different persuasive outcomes based on the route
of processing taken, so the affirmative action information presented in this phase of the
study was carefully worded such that it would be both persuasive and accurate. The
expectation was that participants who took the central route (i.e. participants who
received the high attention instructions) would be persuaded by the content of the
information. These participants were expected to have more positive affirmative action
attitudes than participants who took the peripheral route (i.e. participants who received
the low attention instructions) and so did not pay attention to the information. Again, this
was not the case. There was no main effect of attention on affirmative action attitudes
even though the pilot study showed that attention paid to the message presented did vary
as intended. Therefore, assuming that in the main study, attention to the message also
varied, this varying of attention did not result in different persuasive outcomes. Perhaps
even limited attention to the message was enough to persuade, thus resulting in similar
persuasive outcomes for both groups.
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Affirmative Action Plan Attitudes
While the first phase of the study was about reactions to affirmative action in
general, the second phase of the study concerned reactions to specific affirmative action
plans. Also, in the first phase of the study, modern and non-racists were expected to be
similarly affected by the attention manipulation. In this phase of the study, based on the
theory of modern racism, modern racists were often expected to behave differently from
non-racists. Generally speaking, modern racists and non-racists were expected to behave
in a similar fashion when there was no non-racist justification present (i.e. the affirmative
action plan was fair). However, when opposition to affirmative action could be explained
using a non-racist justification (i.e. the affirmative action plan was unfair), then modern
racists and non-racists would behave differently; modern racists were expected to
discriminate against Blacks in the latter situation.
Fairness of plan, status of position and race of target were all manipulated to
assess the effects on modern and non-racists. As before, there were insufficient oldfashioned racists to include in the analyses. Therefore, since old-fashioned racists were
not considered in the analyses, again, the hypotheses originally proposed were sometimes
different from the ones actually tested.
For the second phase of the study, an interaction between fairness and prejudice
level was expected. Old-fashioned racists would not be affected by fairness but modern
and non-racists would prefer a fair plan to an unfair one. Since the present study was
without enough old-fashioned racists to compare to modern and non-racists, it was not
possible to test for this interaction. Therefore, the data were tested for a main effect of
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fairness since both modern and non-racists were expected to prefer a fair plan to an unfair
one.
As hypothesized, attitudes toward affirmative action plans did vary as a function
of fairness of the plan. Predictably and consistent with previous findings (Doverspike &
Arthur, 1995), participants preferred a fair affirmative action plan (one in which the
minority applicant chosen was as qualified as the non-minority target) to an unfair
affirmative action plan (one in which the minority applicant chosen was less qualified
than the non-minority target).
The reactions to fair affirmative action plans were positive. On the 9-point
semantic differential, where higher numbers indicated more positive attitudes, the
average response to a fair affirmative action plan was a six. This was consistent with the
positive attitudes for the general affirmative action information found in the first part of
the study and discussed above. According to Kravitz and Klineberg (2000), Whites are
more inclined than Blacks or Hispanics to believe that a typical affirmative action plan
consists of strong preferential treatment and unfair advantage to Blacks. Therefore, it is
conceivable that when information was presented contrary to these implicit beliefs,
affirmative action attitudes became more positive. This was consistent with the
conclusion made by Kravtiz et al. (1997) that procedures specified in affirmative action
plans are the strongest determinants of affirmative action attitudes.
Prejudice also played a part in affirmative action plan attitudes; non-racists
responded more favorably to the affirmative action plans than did modern racists. It is
interesting that this was the case for the affirmative action plans presented in the second
phase of the study but not for the general affirmative action information presented in the
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first phase of the study. This may have happened because, for the general affirmative
action information presented in the first phase of the study, there were no possible nonracist justifications for negative affirmative action attitudes. With the affirmative action
plans, in some cases, modern racists could justify their opposition using a fairness
argument. There was however, no prejudice by race of target interaction as would be
expected if this was the case. This is puzzling and may reflect a lack of sensitivity of the
prejudice classifications, which were categorical rather than continuous. When
participants are grouped based on continuous data, participants with scores at the high
end of their group’s distribution are considered different from participants with scores at
the low end of the adjacent group’s distribution. In other words, non-racists’ scores on the
prejudice measures that were high relative to their group would be considered different
from modern racists who had scores that were low relative to their group. In reality, such
participants from different groups scored closer to and were more similar to each other
than they were to some participants from their own groups. Therefore, the method of
classification used probably resulted in participants being classified as non-racists who
were closer to being modern racists than true non-racists and vice versa.
As it stands, for all plans, regardless of the race of the target, non-racists had
more positive affirmative action attitudes than modern racists. This is not to say that race
did not play a factor in affirmative action attitudes. There was an interaction between
fairness, race of target and prejudice that approached significance and will be discussed
below.
Race of target also had an effect on affirmative action plan attitudes. Affirmative
action plans for White targets were preferred to affirmative action plans for Black targets.
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This is incongruent with the significant main effect of prejudice because if prejudice
played a part in affirmative action attitudes, it would stand to reason that only modern
racists would be affected by the race of the target. This was not the case, as was
evidenced by the presence of a race of target main effect but no prejudice by race of
target interaction. This is probably also due to the classification problems discussed
above. The fact that both modern and non-racists were affected by the race of target
supports the idea that the prejudice classifications may have not been sufficiently
sensitive. Therefore, the pattern of data supports the idea that some of the participants
classified as non-racists were incorrectly classified.
Although it was not hypothesized, a significant status by fairness interaction was
found. When the plan was applied to a high status position, participants preferred a fair
plan to an unfair one. However, when the plan was applied to a low status position,
participants preferred an unfair plan to a fair one. Even though the LSD’s were not
significant, this pattern of results was interesting. It seemed as if, given that the
affirmative action plan was fair, participants were more likely to accept plans that helped
minorities and women get into high status positions, and so they more strongly supported
fair affirmative action plans for high status positions than for low status positions. Recall
also that, in this case, an unfair affirmative action plan meant a less qualified person
receiving the position. It seemed that for high status positions, this was more
unacceptable than it was for low status positions. It apparently seemed more egregious if
a less qualified person received a high status job than if they received a low status job.
These findings could also be interpreted using theory of modern racism as well as
the self-interest hypothesis proposed earlier. It is conceivable that a woman and/or a
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minority receiving a high status job results in Whites perceiving the loss of limited
resources and a challenge to a status quo that is in their favor. Under the modern racism
theory, though, opposition to the plan would only be observed (as happened here) when
the plan was unfair since the unfairness provided the non-racist justification for modern
racists. This finding, when conceptualized in this fashion, supports Dovidio’s (2003)
claim that modern racism is more likely to be expressed toward high status Blacks. This
interaction was not qualified by prejudice or race of target as would be expected using
this explanation of the results. However, when only unfair plans with Black targets are
considered, the pattern of results mirrors the one above. This will be further discussed
below. Still, future research is needed to further explore and clarify this fairness by status
interaction.
The original interaction hypothesized between fairness and prejudice level was
expected to be qualified by race of target, creating a three-way interaction between
prejudice level, fairness and race of target. Modern racists were expected to have
similarly favorable affirmative action attitudes toward White and Black targets when the
plan was fair. When the plan was unfair, however, modern racists were expected to
oppose the plan more for Black targets than for White targets. Old-fashioned racists were
expected to oppose affirmative action plans for Black targets regardless of the fairness of
plan and for White targets, prefer fair plans to unfair ones. Non-racists were expected to
prefer fair plans to unfair ones regardless of the race of the target. This three-way
interaction was tested but the cell for old-fashioned racists was not included in the
analysis.
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The interaction between race of target, fairness and prejudice level did approach
significance. Yet, the patterns of cell means were somewhat puzzling and did not support
the hypotheses. Non-racists did not act as expected; they preferred fair plans for White
targets somewhat more than they preferred fair plans for Black targets. When the plan
was unfair, non-racists had similarly negative attitudes for plans involving Black and
White targets. Modern racists, on the other hand, had similarly positive attitudes for fair
plans involving Black and White targets. However, when the plan was unfair, there was a
small, non-significant preference for the plans with White targets. These patterns are
intriguing, but it must be reemphasized that these were only patterns and the overall
interaction was not significant. Thus, we may, in fact, be looking at sampling error rather
than meaningful differences.
The last original hypothesis involved the status manipulation. Since old-fashioned
racists were not included in this hypothesis, it was tested as originally intended. It was
expected that, when the plan was unfair and the target was Black, modern racists would
prefer plans applied to low status positions to plans applied to high status positions.
The hypothesized difference for modern racists between unfair plans for Black
targets competing for a high status job and unfair plans for Black targets competing for a
low status job was not found.
Some of the findings of this study seemed inconsistent with each other. On the
one hand, there were indications that the prejudice level classifications were somewhat
effective in distinguishing modern racists from non-racists. The main effect of prejudice
and the three-way interaction between race of target, prejudice level and fairness
approached significance and so lent support this position. However, there were also

49
indications that suggested that the method of prejudice classification was not as accurate
as it could have been. Firstly and most importantly, classifications were done by placing
participants into categories as opposed to treating prejudice as a continuous variable.
Secondly, even though the main effect of prejudice approached significance, there was no
interaction between prejudice and race of target. If the prejudice classifications were
entirely valid, then modern racists should have reacted more negatively to affirmative
action plans targeted toward Blacks than Whites and non-racists should have reacted
similarly to both types of plans. Instead, there was a main effect of race of target,
meaning that all participants reacted more negatively to Black participants. As stated
before, this should not have been the case for non-racists. In addition, the planned
comparison originally intended to be done using only modern racists was only significant
after it was conducted using both modern racists and non-racists.
One alternative to the procedure of categorical prejudice classifications would
have been to rank participants along a continuum of prejudice. Using this approach would
have avoided the problem of not having enough old-fashioned racists for analysis. Yet,
ranking participants along a continuum has its own problems. Consider the following
scenario. There are two participants with a combined score of 50. Participant A scored 45
on the explicit measure and 5 on the implicit measure. Participant B scored 5 on the
explicit measure and 45 on the implicit measure. Summing the scores for the prejudice
scales to create a single prejudice variable would not be advisable because in such an
approach both participants would receive the same prejudice score. This makes these two
participants indistinguishable. This is problematic because these two people are, indeed,
different and need to be treated as such. Participant B is a modern racist (as evidenced by
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a high score on the implicit measure and a low score on the explicit measure) but
participant A is not. Another, more suitable approach as done by James et al. in their
2001 study, is to simply give participants a measure of modern racism, such as the
Modern Racism Scale or the Implicit Association Test, and use the scores to rank
participants along a continuum of modern racism. Future studies on the effects of modern
racism on affirmative action attitudes should consider using such an approach as an
alternative to prejudice classifications.
In addition, the paper and pencil IAT may not have been the best choice for
determining the prejudice levels of individuals. According to the creators of the paper and
pencil IAT, it is “less sensitive than computer IATs and may be less capable of assessing
individual differences” (Lemm et al., 2002). This information unfortunately became
available only after the present study was underway. This may account for some of the
possible imprecision in prejudice classifications and could have limited the capability of
the present study to detect stronger results, such as a significant main effect of prejudice,
an interaction between prejudice and race, and a significant difference for modern racists
between plans applied to high status versus low status positions when the plan was unfair
and the target was Black. Future studies interested in determining the prejudice levels of
individuals should probably use the computer-based IAT as opposed to the paper and
pencil IAT.
Supplemental Analyses
Based on the idea that the prejudice classifications were imprecise because they
were done categorically, the effects of prejudice level on affirmative action attitudes were
re-examined using regression analyses that attempted to predict semantic differential
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scores from IAT scores, ATB scores and the interaction between IAT and ATB scores.
The semantic differential scores from the first phase of the study were significantly
predicted by ATB scores, ß = -.229, t = -2.11, p < .05, but not by IAT scores, ß = -.053, t
= -.487, p > .05, or the interaction term, ß = .108, t = .999, p < .05. The pattern of results
was similar for semantic differential scores from the second phase of the study. The ATB
predicted attitudes, ß = -.147, t = -1.87, p = .063, but the IAT and the interaction term did
not (ß = -1.20, t = -1.57, p > .05 & ß = -.229, t = .114 , p > .05). These findings support
the above recommendation to the use the computer-based IAT when assessing the
prejudice level of individuals.
Conclusion
Affirmative action has been and still is a controversial topic. Still, because of
implicit negative attitudes toward Blacks, it is necessary. These implicit negative
attitudes mean that persons who consider themselves non-racists may still discriminate
against Blacks provided they have some non-racist justification for doing so. Therefore,
as it stands, Blacks attempting to advance in the workplace do not have a fair chance at
doing so, thus the need for affirmative action. This being the case, it is important for the
topic of affirmative action to be studied.
Many questions remain unanswered. Knowing that Whites have many erroneous
conceptions of affirmative action (Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000), how can these
conceptions be changed? What must be done so that Whites consider affirmative action
in general (as opposed to specific affirmative action plans) as fair and just? And finally,
why do Whites oppose affirmative action? The present study proposed three answers to
this question: fairness, prejudice and self-interest.
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The significant main effect of fairness indicates that fairness is a factor. This is
consistent with the work of other authors (Doverspike & Arthur, 1995, Kravitz, 1995,
Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000). The significant main effect of prejudice found in the present
study supports the work of various authors that indicate that prejudice is also factor
(Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000; Kravitz et al., 2000; Little et al., 1998 & James et al., 2001).
However, the absence of a prejudice by race interaction does not support the work of
these authors. Further research that includes a continuous prejudice variable as well as a
race of target variable needs to be conducted to investigate the failure to find an
interaction between prejudice and race of target. If research is done that considers
prejudice as a continuous variable also consistently fails to find a prejudice by race
interaction, then the conclusion that opposition to affirmative action is a direct result of
prejudice toward Blacks needs to be reconsidered and perhaps modified.
The idea that self-interest plays a part in affirmative action attitudes was also
supported by the present study. Since the status manipulation was an operationalization
of the self-interest motivation in Whites, the fairness by status interaction and the
differences found in reactions to the unfair, high status plans for Black targets and the
unfair, low status plans for Black targets both support Dovidio’s (2003) idea that selfinterest is a factor in affirmative action attitudes.
It is also important to empirically determine how to lessen misconceptions of
affirmative action because of the effects these misconceptions have on the targets of
affirmative action. When targets of affirmative action believe that they were selected
primarily on the basis of their race, they tend to withdraw from the task or job for which
they were selected (Heilman, Simon and Repper, 1987 & Heilman, Rivero and Brett,
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1991) and perform worse on the task than counterparts who believe they were selected
primarily on the basis of merit (Brown et al., 2000 & Heilman, Rivero and Brett, 1991).
For non-targets of affirmative action, the belief that preferential selection occurs results
in negative job attitudes (Graves and Powell, 1994).
In conclusion, affirmative action policies are sorely needed as is supporting
research to guide its implementation and guard against negative consequences for
intended beneficiaries and the organizations that implement these policies. Research such
as the present study that adds to the understanding of why affirmative action is opposed
can be used to guide its implementation. As it stands, the “bottom line” is this: People
tend not to oppose fair affirmative action plans. Since, without information, people tend
to assume affirmative action is unfair, when an affirmative action plan is being
implemented, care should be taken to provide information highlighting the fairness of and
reason for (e.g. underutilization of qualified minorities) the affirmative action plan.
Researchers could provide supporting research on the best way to achieve this goal. In
this way, researchers and practitioners can work together to ensure that affirmative action
policies continue to be used well into the future.

54

References
Bell, M.P., Harrison, D.A., & McLaughlin, M.E. (2000). Forming, changing, and
acting on attitude toward affirmative action programs in employment: A theory-driven
approach. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85 (5), 784-798.
Bobo, L. (1998). Race, interests and beliefs about affirmative action: Unanswered
questions and directions. American Behavioral Scientist, 41 (7), 985-1003.
Brown, R.P., Charnsangavej, T., Keough, K.A., Newman, M.L., Rentfrow, P.J.
(2000). Putting the “affirm” into affirmative action: preferential selection and academic
performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79 (5), 736-747.
Clayton, S.D., & Tangri, S.S. (1989). The justice of affirmative action. In F.A.
Blanchard & F.J. Crosby (Eds.) Affirmative action in perspective (pp. 177-192). New
York: Springer-Verlag.
Doverspike, D. & Arthur, W., Jr. (1995). Race and sex differences in reactions to
a simulated selection decision involving race-based affirmative action. Journal of Black
Psychology, 21 (2), 181-200.
Dovidio, J.F. (2001) Why can’t we all just get along? Aversive racism and
interracial distrust. Paper presented at the meeting of the National Institute of the
Teaching of Psychology, St. Pete Beach, FL.
Dovidio, J.F. & Gaertner, S.L. (1999). Reducing prejudice: Combating intergroup
biases. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8 (4), 101-105.

55
Dovidio, J.F., Mann, J.A., & Gaertner, S.L. (1989). Resistance to affirmative
action: The implication of aversive racism. In F.A. Blanchard & F.J. Crosby (Eds.)
Affirmative action in perspective (pp. 61-89). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Fishbein, M. & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention and behavior. Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley.
Glasser, I. (1988). Affirmative action and the legacy of racial injustice. In P.A.
Katz & D.A. Taylor (Eds.), Eliminating racism: Profiles in courage (pp. 341-358). New
York: Plenum Press.
Graves, L.M., Powell, G.N. (1994). Effects of sex-based preferential selection and
discrimination on job attitudes. Human Relations, 47 (2), 133-157.
Greenberg, J. (1987). A taxonomy of organizational justice theories. Academy of
Management Review, 12, 9-22.
Greenberg, J. (1990). Organizational justice: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow.
Journal of Management, 16, 917-927.
Heilman, M.E., Rivero, J.C., & Brett, J.F. (1991). Skirting the competence issue:
effects of sex-based preferential selection on task choices of women and men. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 76 (1), 99-105.
Heilman, M.E., Simon, M.C., Repper, D.P. (1987). Intentionally favored,
unintentionally harmed? Impact of sex-based preferential selection on self-perceptions
and self-evaluations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 72 (1), 62-68.
James, E.H., Dietz, J., Brief, A.P. & Cohen, R.R. (2001). Prejudice matters:
understanding the reactions of Whites to affirmative action programs targeted to benefit
Blacks. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86 (6), 1120-1128.

56
Katz, I. & Hass, R.G. (1988). Racial ambivalence and American value conflict:
Correlational and priming studies of dual cognitive structures. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 55 (6), 893-905.
Kinder, D.R. & Sears, D.O. (1981). Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic racism
versus racial threats to the good life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40,
414-431.
Konrad, A.M. & Linneham, F. (1995). Race and sex differences in line managers’
reactions to equal employment opportunity and affirmative action interventions. Group
and Organization Management, 20 (4), 409-439.
Kravitz, D.A. (1995). Attitudes towards affirmative action plans directed at
blacks: Effects of plan and individual differences. Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
25 (24), 2192-2220.
Kravitz, D.A., Klineberg, S.L. (2000). Reactions to two versions of affirmative
action among Whites, Blacks and Hispanics. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85 (4), 597611.
Kravitz, D.A. & Platina, J. (1993). Attitudes and beliefs about affirmative action:
Effects of target and of respondent sex and ethnicity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78
(6), 928-938.
Leck, J.D., Saunders, D.M. & Charbonneau, M. (1996). Affirmative action
programs: An organizational justice perspective. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 17,
79-89.

57
Lemm, K., Sattler, D.N., Khan, S., Mitchell, R.A., Dahl, J. (2002). Reliability and
validity of a paper-based implicit association test. Paper presented at the third annual
Society of Personality and Social Psychology conference, Savannah, GA.
Leventhal, G.S. (1976). Fairness in social relationships. In J.W. Thibaut, J.T.
Spence, & R.C. Carson (Eds.), Contemporary topics in social psychology. (pp. 21-239).
Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
LeVine, R.A., & Campbell, D.T. (1972). Ethnocentrism. New York:Wiley.
Little, B.L., Murray, W.D. & Wimbush, J.C. (1998). Perceptions of workplace
affirmative action plans. Group and Organization Management, 23 (1), 27-47.
McConahay, J.B. (1982). “Self-interest versus racial attitudes as correlates of antibusing attitudes in Louisville: Is it the buses or the blacks?” Journal of Politics, 44, 692720.
McConahay, J.B. & Hough, J.C. , Jr. (1976). Symbolic racism. Journal of Social
Issues, 32 (2), 23-45.
McFarlin, D.B. & Sweeney, P.D. (1992). Distributive and procedural justice as
predictors of satisfaction with organizational outcomes. Academy of Management
Journal, 35, (3), 626-637.
Murrell, A.J., Dietz-Uhler, B.L., Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L., & Drout, C.
(1994). Aversive racism and resistance to affirmative action: perceptions of justice are
not necessarily color blind. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 15 (1&2), 71-86.
Nacoste, R.W. (1990). Sources of stigma: Analyzing the psychology of
affirmative action. Law and Policy, 12, 175-195.

58
Nacoste, R.W. (1996). How affirmative action can pass constitutional and social
psychological muster. Journal of Social Issues, 52 (4), 133-144.
Petty, R.E. & Cacioppo, J.T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and
contemporary approaches. Dubuque, IA: Brown.
Rioux, S.M. & Penner, L.A. (1999). Aversive racism, aversive sexism, and
reactions to affirmative action programs. Paper presented at the meeting of the American
Psychological Association.
Sears, D.O. (1988). Symbolic Racism. In Katz P.A. & Taylor, D.A. (Eds.),
Eliminating racism: Profiles in controversy. (pp. 53-84). New York: Plenum Press.
Sears, D.O., Van Laar, C., Carrillo, M., Kosterman, R. (1997). Is it really racism?
The origins of White Americans’ opposition to race-targeted policies. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 61, 16-53.
Summers, R.J.(1995). Attitudes toward different methods of affirmative action.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 25 (12), 1090-1104.

59

APPENDIX

60
Appendix A . Affirmative Action Information

Instructions for high attention condition:
We are interested in people’s opinions of laws and government policies. In this
particular study, we are interested in how certain kinds of information might
affect peoples’ opinions about affirmative action. Please read the following
information very carefully, as you will be asked questions about the content at the
end of the session.
Instructions for low attention condition:
We are interested in people’s opinions of laws and government policies. In this
particular study, we are interested in how certain kinds of information might
affect peoples’ opinions about affirmative action. Please read the following
information as quickly as possible, as you only have a few minutes.

Equality and fairness are very important values to most Americans.
Unfortunately however, Americans may sometimes fail to act in ways that
promote these values. One example can be found in the workplace. Statistical
studies show that Blacks and Whites are not treated equally in the workplace. For
example, according to the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission Report, less than
1% of senior-level managers in the biggest companies in the United States are
Black; over 99% are White. Differences in education cannot explain this huge
disparity. African-American men with professional degrees earn only 79% of the
salary of White men with the same amount of education and African-American
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professional women earn only 60% of the salary of comparable White men. This
means that an African-American male must work about eight months to receive
the same salary that his White counterpart would earn in six months and an
African-American female must work ten months. Minorities not only earn less
than their non-minority counterparts, they are also promoted less often and are
less likely to receive valuable training opportunities.
Clearly then, equality and fairness do not seem to have been achieved in
the workplace. One solution to this problem is affirmative action policies, which
were created to reduce discrimination in the workplace
Affirmative action is defined as a set of goals and timetables for increasing
the number of women and minorities in the workplace. It is usually only
employed when women and minorities are under-represented in the workplace. If
it is found that a large number of qualified women and minorities exist but are not
being hired, women and minorities are said to be underutilized and
underrepresented in the company. This would indicate that White males are being
hired much more often than minorities and women even though qualified
minorities and women are available. In such a case, an affirmative action plan is
used to increase the representation of women and minorities in that company.
Affirmative action plans are temporary and have a specified end date.
They are only to be used when there is clear evidence that women and/or
minorities are underrepresented in some specific job or company. After the end
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date of the affirmative action plan, fairer selection and promotion practices are
used to avoid discrimination against women and minorities.
Numerous Supreme Court cases have created guidelines for what
constitutes a legal affirmative action plan. For example, contrary to popular
opinion, under current affirmative action laws, quotas are illegal. The only
exceptions to this would be when a court finds that a company has failed to
comply with other kinds of affirmative action plans.
The assumption that affirmative action results in unqualified minorities
being hired is also incorrect. The qualifications of the applicants are never to be
ignored. Affirmative action laws do not allow the hiring of a less qualified
minority candidate over a more qualified non-minority candidate. However, if
minorities are found to be underrepresented in the company, it is acceptable to
temporarily choose to hire minority candidates over non-minority candidates with
the same qualifications.
Thus, affirmative action is not a plan that gives Blacks and women an
unfair advantage over other people. Rather it is intended to create equal
opportunities for all people regardless of their race, religion or gender. Thus,
some people believe that affirmative action is entirely consistent with the values
of equality and freedom that all Americans hold dear.
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Appendix B. Multiple choice questions asked in pilot study

The following questions refer to the affirmative action information you have just
received. Please read the questions and circle the best answer.

1. Which of the following statements describes how carefully you read the affirmative
action information presented to you?
a) I read the information more carefully than I usually read other material.
b) I read the information as carefully as I usually read other material.
c) I read the information a little less carefully than I usually read other material.
d) I read the information a lot less carefully than I usually read other material.

2. Which of the following statements were included in the instructions you received
with the affirmative action information?
a) Please circle all positive statements about affirmative action.
b) Please circle all negative statements about affirmative action.
c) Please read the following information carefully, as you will be asked questions
about the content at the end of the session.
d) Please read the following information as quickly as possible, as you only have a
few minutes.
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3. According to the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission Report, less than ______ of
senior-level managers in the biggest companies in the United States are Black.
a) 10%
b) 5%
c) 3%
d) 1%

4. Affirmative action is defined as
a) affirming the action of employing women and minorities
b) the enhancement of opportunities for women and minorities in the workplace
c) a set of goals and timetables for increasing the number of women and minorities
in the workplace
d) ensuring that large numbers of women and minorities are hired by the company

5. Minorities are considered underutilized when
a) the percentage of qualified minorities hired is not equal to the percentage of
qualified non-minorities hired
b) they are placed in higher level positions but are not allowed to complete certain
tasks
c) they are not being hired
d) they are not being promoted
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6. The primary goal of an affirmative action plan is to
a) maintain fair selection and promotion practices
b) increase the representation of women and minorities in the company
c) give unqualified women and minorities a chance to prove their abilities
d) improve the image of a company

7. Which of the following statements is false?
a) Affirmative action plans are temporary.
b) In most affirmative action plans, quotas are illegal.
c) An affirmative action plan can only be used when there is evidence that women
and/or minorities are underrepresented in the company.
d) Affirmative action includes keeping the number of minorities in the company
equal to the number of non-minorities in the company.

8. When can a company implement quotas?
a) At any time
b) When women and minorities are found to be underrepresented in the company
c) Only when a court orders it
d) Never
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9. Which of the following statements is false?
a) An affirmative action plan can only be used when women and/or minorities are
found to be underrepresented in the workplace.
b) Affirmative action plans have a specified end date.
c) A court can order the implementation of quotas if the company has failed to
comply with other affirmative action plans.
d) It is acceptable to temporarily hire minorities over non-minorities even if the
minority applicant is less qualified than the non-minority applicant.
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Appendix C. Affirmative action plan vignettes

We are interested in people’s opinions of various types of affirmative action plans. The
following descriptions did not actually happen, but as you read, try to imagine that you
work for this company and think about how you would feel if this situation had happened
at your company.

XYZ cooperation has recently completed an evaluation of their hiring practices.
According to this evaluation, large numbers of qualified individuals are available in the
pool of potential employees but are not being hired by XYZ, and as a result, some groups
are under-represented in the company. To remedy this problem, XYZ has decided to
implement an affirmative action plan. Therefore, for three months, XYZ will attempt to
hire more women and minorities. You will read a few examples of some ways XYZ
might handle this problem. After reading each one, you will answer questions about this
solution. Try not to let your opinions about one solution influence your opinions about
another.
White, high status position, fair scenario:
Both Janet and Michael applied to XYZ for a position as the Vice President of Marketing.
Janet and Michael are equally qualified for this position. Janet is a White female. Michael
is a White male. Janet was chosen over Michael for the position.
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White, high status position, unfair scenario:
Both Janet and Michael applied to XYZ for a position as the Vice President of Marketing.
Janet is less qualified for the position than Michael is. Janet is a White female. Michael is
a White male. Janet was chosen over Michael for the position.
White, low status position, unfair scenario:
Both Janet and Michael applied to XYZ for a position as a data entry clerk. Janet is less
qualified for the position than Michael is. Janet is a White female. Michael is a White
male. Janet was chosen over Michael for the position.
Black, low status position, unfair scenario:
Both Janet and Michael applied to XYZ for a position as a data entry clerk. Janet is less
qualified for the position than Michael is. Janet is a Black female. Michael is a White
male. Janet was chosen over Michael for the position.
Black, high status position, unfair scenario:
Both Janet and Michael applied to XYZ for a position as the Vice President of Marketing.
Janet is less qualified for the position than Michael is. Janet is a Black female. Michael is
a White male. Janet was chosen over Michael for the position.
Black, low status position, fair scenario:
Both Janet and Michael applied to XYZ for a position as a data entry clerk. Janet and
Michael are equally qualified for this position. Janet is a Black female. Michael is a
White male. Janet was chosen over Michael for the position.
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Black, high status position, fair scenario:
Both Janet and Michael applied to XYZ for a position as the Vice President of Marketing.
Janet and Michael are equally qualified for this position. Janet is a Black female. Michael
is a White male. Janet was chosen over Michael for the position.
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Appendix D. Affirmative action plan semantic differential.

Please indicate your opinion by of XYZ’s affirmative action plan by circling one number
in each row.
XYZ’s affirmative action plan
Right

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Wrong

Bad

1
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5
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7

8
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Good

Correct

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Incorrect

Unjust

1
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4

5
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8

9

Just

Positive
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8
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Negative

Unfair

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Fair

Objective

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Biased
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Appendix E. Affirmative action semantic differential.

Please indicate your opinion by of XYZ’s affirmative action plan by circling one number
in each row.
XYZ’s affirmative action plan
Right

1
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